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An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing 
Combatants from Civilians in the War Against 
Terrorism* 
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving 
a proper balance between freedom and order. 
  —Chief Justice William Rehnquist1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 10, 2001, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri entered the 
United States to further a pledge he had made to Osama Bin Laden.2  
According to the Director of the Joint Intelligence Task Force for 
Combating Terrorism,3 al-Marri first met Bin Laden in the summer of 
2001 upon the urging of Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, the mastermind 
behind the attacks on September 11.4  Previously trained in the use of 
poisons at an al Qaeda camp and armed with an undergraduate degree 
from a respectable American university,5 al-Marri seemed perfectly 
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 1. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222 
(1998). 
 2. Declaration of Mr. Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating 
Terrorism at 4, al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright (al-Marri I), 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) 
(No. 2:04-2257-HFF) [hereinafter Rapp Declaration], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-srv/nation/documents/jeffreyrapp_document.pdf. 
 3. The Rapp Declaration served as the basis for the government’s allegations when al-Marri 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.  Al-Marri I, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 780, rev’d en banc per curiam 
sub nom. al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008).  Although the allegations against al-
Marri have yet to be proven in a court of law, al-Marri refused to present evidence to support his 
claim that he did not qualify for “enemy combatant” status.  Id. at 784.  The Fourth Circuit panel, 
rehearing al-Marri’s petition on appeal, decided the case “assuming the truth of the Government’s 
allegations.”  Al-Marri v. Wright (al-Marri II), 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc 
per curiam sub nom. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213.  Likewise, the plurality of the en banc court issued 
the per curiam opinion on the assumption that the government’s allegations were true.  Pucciarelli 
(al-Marri III), 534 F.3d at 216. 
 4. Rapp Declaration, supra note 2, at 5. 
 5. Id.  Officials in the Justice Department explained after al-Marri’s classification as an enemy 
combatant that he was alleged by another al Qaeda member in detention to have been trained in the 
use of poisons.  Al Qaeda Suspect Declared ‘Enemy Combatant,’ CNN, June 24, 2003, 
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qualified for the tasks Bin Laden had in mind: espionage and sabotage.  
At the meeting with Bin Laden, al-Marri agreed to move to the United 
States to act as a “sleeper agent.”6  Bin Laden instructed al-Marri to enter 
the United States before September 11, 2001, or failing this, to cancel his 
plans and travel to Pakistan.7  Once in the United States, al-Marri was to 
explore the possibility of hacking into the main-frame computers of 
banks in order to sabotage U.S. banking records and thereby damage the 
U.S. economy.8 
When FBI agents questioned al-Marri pursuant to a material witness 
warrant in December 2001, they uncovered on his laptop numerous files 
and bookmarked Internet sites relating to dangerous chemicals and 
poisons, including cyanides used in the manufacture of chemical 
weapons.9  The agents also found several computer programs used by 
hackers, lectures by Bin Laden regarding the importance of jihad and 
martyrdom, photographs of the September 11 attacks, and a cartoon 
image of a plane flying toward the World Trade Center.10  After 
receiving additional information regarding al-Marri’s attempted contacts 
with al Qaeda,11 President Bush declared him an enemy combatant and 
al-Marri was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina.12  Upon a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a panel of the Fourth Circuit 
determined that al-Marri, although a “grave threat” to the security of the 
United States,13 did not qualify as an “enemy combatant” as he had 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/23/qatar.combatant/.  Al-Marri allegedly trained at the camp for 
fifteen to nineteen months between 1996 and 1998.  Rapp Declaration, supra note 2, at 5. 
 6. Rapp Declaration, supra note 2, at 5. 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Id.  Al Qaeda has remained interested in sabotaging the U.S. economy.  See E. Alshech, 
‘The Battle . . . Is Economic Rather than Military’—An Economically Oriented Concept of Jihad 
Emerges in Islamist Discourse, MEMRI: THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Sept. 11, 
2007, http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=IA38707. 
 9. Rapp Declaration, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
 10. Id. at 10–11. 
 11. While in the United States, al-Marri allegedly attempted to contact Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammed and Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, al Qaeda members providing logistical support for 
the attacks on September 11, 2001.  Id. at 8–9, 11–12. 
 12. Id. at 2.  See also Al Qaeda Suspect Declared ‘Enemy Combatant,’ supra note 5 (discussing 
the Justice Department’s explanation of al-Marri’s classification).  President Bush announced that al-
Marri had “engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in 
preparation for acts of international terrorism.”  Id.  The information obtained by the government 
indicated that al-Marri, although trained in the use of poisons, had not yet been ordered to carry out a 
biological or chemical attack in the United States.  Id. 
 13. The majority stated “[i]f the Government’s allegations are true, and we assume they are for 
present purposes, al-Marri . . . is a dangerous enemy of this nation who has committed serious 
crimes and associated with a secret enemy organization that has engaged in hostilities against us.”  
Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 189 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc per curiam sub nom. al-Marri III, 
534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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neither engaged in battle in Afghanistan nor affiliated with a territorial 
state.14  Although individuals entering enemy territory to engage in 
espionage have traditionally qualified as unlawful enemy combatants,15 
the panel refused to extend law of war principles, such as combatant 
status, to members of non-state terrorist organizations.  On appeal, a 
plurality of the en banc court held that the government’s allegations, if 
true, sufficed to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant.16 
The al-Marri decisions present grave and pressing questions 
regarding the appropriate limits of governmental power to detain 
suspected terrorists within our borders.  Since September 11, 2001, 
hundreds have been detained in military prisons—held without charge 
regardless of their citizenship or place of capture—pursuant to an 
executive determination that they qualify as “enemy combatants.”17  
Although the “enemy combatant” label therefore carries serious 
implications, the term still has no definitive parameters in the context of 
the fight against terrorism.  Traditionally, a “combatant” has referred to a 
soldier, bearing arms in the name of a warring state.18  However, the 
executive and legislative branches have adopted definitions of an “enemy 
combatant” encompassing all persons who affiliate with and provide 
support to al Qaeda, regardless of whether they are found upon a 
battlefield.19  This approach recognizes the atrocities of September 11 as 
acts of war by expanding the traditional notion of the “enemy” to 
encompass non-state organizations.  Such broad military reach into 
matters previously considered to be within the civilian domain20 
                                                          
 14. Id. at 183. 
 15. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7–8, 15 (1942) (holding that German saboteurs became 
unlawful combatants upon entering into the United States without uniform, in violation of the laws 
of war). 
 16. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 216. 
 17. Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful 
Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).  In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the executive’s power to militarily detain those qualifying as 
“enemy combatants.”  542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
 18. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT 
OF ENEMY COMBATANTS (2002), at 8, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy_ 
combatants.pdf. 
 19. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in 
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  Various definitions have been proposed through 
legislative bills since the attacks on September 11, 2001.  For example, the Detention of Enemy 
Combatants Act sought to authorize the detention as an “enemy combatant” of any individual who 
was “a member of al Qaeda, or knowingly cooperated with a member of al Qaeda in the planning, 
authorizing, committing, aiding, or abetting of one or more terrorist acts against the United States.”  
Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). 
 20. Thomas Crocker, Still Waiting for the Barbarians: What is New about Post-September 11 
Exceptionalism?, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 303, 318–19 (2007). 
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significantly threatens several essential civil liberties.21  Yet rigid 
adherence to traditional, state-based conceptions of warfare seems to be 
an unsatisfactory response to the security risk posed by modern 
transnational terrorist organizations as well. 
This Comment addresses the proper parameters for the term “enemy 
combatant” in an age in which warfare may no longer be considered to 
occur only between states.  It concludes that the term “enemy combatant” 
should encompass al Qaeda operatives actively engaged in or preparing 
for hostile activity within the United States, regardless of their 
citizenship.  To support this claim, it will provide background 
information on the term “enemy combatant,” including its historical roots 
in American jurisprudence, its current use by the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches, and its status under the international treaties and 
agreements constituting the laws of war.  It will then address the 
rationales for expanding the traditional notion of a “combatant” to 
encompass suspected terrorists—particularly the enormous security risks 
posed by such individuals and the clear intent of Congress to authorize 
the use of force against a non-state organization. 
It will then consider the laws of war and, more specifically, the 
historical purposes for distinguishing combatants from civilians and how 
states have traditionally treated hostile civilians during conflicts.  With 
the law of war as a guidepost in determining combatant status, it will 
propose a definition successfully balancing the executive’s security 
concerns with the need to prevent governmental encroachment upon 
cherished civil liberties.  Under the proposed definition, an “enemy 
combatant” includes: 
 
(a) An individual who qualifies for prisoner of war status under 
the Third Geneva Convention; or 
(b) An individual who does not qualify for prisoner of war status 
under the Third Geneva Convention but who 
1. Is affiliated with a state or organization with which the 
United States is engaged in a recognized armed conflict; 
2. Engages in, aids and abets, or prepares to commit hostile 
acts against the United States or its co-belligerents; and 
3. Acts with the intent thereby to harm the nation, its 
civilians, its economy, or its national security.  
 
                                                          
 21. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2008) (discussing the differences in 
procedural protections and burdens of proof between the military detention model and the criminal 
model). 
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The Comment will conclude by describing the precise aspects of the 
proposed definition that comport with due process requirements and 
protect fundamental rights. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Enemy Inside: The Threat Posed by Al Qaeda Agents Within the 
United States 
Al Qaeda remains the most serious terrorist threat the United States 
faces.22  It is believed that al Qaeda still attempts to infiltrate operatives 
into the United States23 and will intensify its efforts to do so over the 
next few years.24  Indeed, al Qaeda has warned that muhajideen have 
successfully infiltrated our borders in preparation for another attack.25  
The organization’s successful efforts to advance its ideology have kept 
the FBI busy foiling attempted terrorist plots on our homeland.26  Al 
Qaeda remains highly active in allied nations as well, demonstrating the 
enduring necessity of preventive action to reduce the likelihood of 
another terrorist attack.27 
                                                          
 22. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST 
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_ 
release.pdf. 
 23. Threat Assessment: Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 110th 
Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Mueller statement] (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/mueller011107.htm. 
 24. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 22. 
 25. BBC News, Text: ‘Bin-Laden tape,’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4628932.stm 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2008).  See also CNN, Al-Zawahiri: Bush the ‘Butcher of Washington,’ 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/01/30/zawahiri.transcript/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
 26. See Mueller statement, supra note 23 (describing recent plots against John F. Kennedy 
International Airport and Fort Dix, N.J., organized by “homegrown” terrorists).  For more 
information regarding al Qaeda’s efforts to advance its ideology, see generally Combating Al Qaeda 
and Militant Jihadists: Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hoffman 
statement] (statement of Bruce Hoffman, Chair, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, The 
RAND Corp.), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf. 
 27. According to the Director of the British Security Service, the United Kingdom in early 
2007 was tracking 1600 people involved in at least 200 networks actively plotting terrorist attacks 
against targets in Britain.  As of November 2006, Britain was tracking at least thirty plots, many of 
which were “linked to al Qaeda in Pakistan and using British-born foot soldiers living in the United 
Kingdom in its attack planning.”  Mueller statement, supra note 23. 
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B. The Executive Argument and the Legal Ramifications of “Enemy 
Combatant” Status 
In immediate response to the attacks of September 11, Congress 
authorized the President to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.28 
The executive branch asserted that this broad grant of authority in the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized not only 
the initiation of warfare in Afghanistan but also the detainment of 
“enemy combatants” captured as part of the “global war on terror.”29  
The executive has also maintained that the President has inherent 
constitutional authority to do so.30 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the executive’s 
assertion that the AUMF granted the President the power to detain 
“enemy combatants” as a fundamental incident of the “necessary and 
appropriate force” authorized.31  Hamdi, an American citizen, 
surrendered to U.S. troops while fighting alongside members of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.32  The Court concluded that individuals fighting 
alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan (a traditional battlefield) clearly fall 
within the category of individuals Congress sought to target under the 
                                                          
 28. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
(2001). 
 29. On November 13, 2001, the President issued an executive order, pursuant to the power 
granted to him by the AUMF, permitting the detention and trial by military commission of al Qaeda 
members, terrorists or suspected terrorists, and any who harbor them.  Detention, Treatment, and 
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  
See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (recognizing the President’s authority to 
detain “enemy combatants” pursuant to the AUMF). 
 30. Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 177 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc per curiam sub nom. al-
Marri III, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008).  Whether the President has such inherent authority remains a 
contested issue, especially in regards to the detainment of U.S. citizens.  See, e.g., Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 155 (2004) (arguing that the 
President does not have inherent authority to detain). 
 31. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–19. 
 32. Id.  The military initially detained Hamdi in Afghanistan but then transferred him to the 
Guantánamo Naval Base in January 2002.  Id. at 510.  In April 2002, the military discovered 
Hamdi’s citizenship and transferred him to a naval brig in South Carolina.  Id. 
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AUMF.33  Because the Court recognized that the AUMF provides the 
President with statutory authority to detain “enemy combatants,” it did 
not address whether the President has inherent constitutional authority to 
do so.34 
C. American Citizens Aiding the Enemy: Wartime Decisions That 
Define the Parameters of the Debate 
1. The Enemy Combatant Label Emerges: Ex Parte Quirin 
The phrase “enemy combatant” stems from a decision by the United 
States Supreme Court in the midst of World War II.35  On June 13 and 
17, 1942, during “the hours of darkness,” eight individuals exited 
German submarines positioned off the coast of the United States and 
went ashore.36  They discarded the German infantry uniforms they were 
wearing and buried them, along with explosives, fuses, and incendiary 
and timing devices.37  They entered New York City and Jacksonville, 
Florida, in two separate groups, wearing civilian attire.38  Soon 
thereafter, they were taken into custody by the FBI.39  Each had received 
instructions “from an officer of the German High Command to destroy 
war industries and war facilities in the United States.”40  Each had been 
trained at a sabotage school in Berlin prior to arrival in the United 
States.41  One was a citizen of the United States.42 
On July 2, 1942, the President proclaimed: 
[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at 
war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the 
direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or 
attempt to enter the United States through coastal or boundary defenses, 
and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit  
 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 518. 
 34. Id. at 516–17. 
 35. Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins of the Term “Enemy Combatant” Do Not Support its 
Present Day Use, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 145, 147 (2005). 
 36. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).  For a more detailed discussion of the case, see 
LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 
(2002), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-2383:1. 
 37. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 20. 
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sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of 
war [would be subject to] military tribunals.43 
The eight saboteurs were therefore taken into military custody.44  The 
next day, they were charged with violating the laws of war, spying, and 
conspiring to commit the aforementioned offenses.45  They petitioned for 
a writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of 
their detention and trial by military commission.  The Court 
distinguished between lawful and unlawful combatants, noting that while 
lawful combatants are to be classified as prisoners of war, subject to 
capture and detention, unlawful combatants are additionally “subject to 
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.”46  The Court provided the following examples of 
when an individual could properly be detained as an unprivileged 
belligerent: when a spy “secretly and without uniform passes the military 
lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather information and 
communicate it to the enemy,” or when “an enemy combatant who 
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of 
waging war by destruction of life or property.”47 
The Court in Ex parte Quirin used several terms in referring to the 
petitioners, such as “unlawful combatants,” “enemy combatants,” and 
“enemy belligerents.”48  It has been argued that the interchangeable use 
of such terms and the nature of the conflict at issue demonstrate that the 
Court intended the phrase “enemy combatant” to apply only to soldiers 
who had violated the laws of war.49  Indeed, the Quirin Court did not 
“distinguish between enemy soldiers who forfeit the right to be treated as 
prisoners of war by failing to distinguish themselves as belligerents . . . 
and civilians who commit hostile acts during war without having the 
right to participate in combat.”50  Although the executive has relied upon  
 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 22–23. 
 44. Id. at 23. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 31. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Woolman, supra note 35, at 148. 
 49. Id. 
 50. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 12 (2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink 
/meta-crs-6142:1.  Later decisions of the Supreme Court applied the terms “enemy combatant” and 
“unlawful combatant” to uniformed soldiers who had violated the laws of war.  See, e.g., In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1946) (authorizing the use of a military commission to prosecute the 
war crimes of a Japanese General). 
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Quirin to justify the military detention of suspected terrorists, the 
intended scope of the decision remains uncertain.51 
2.  Ex parte Milligan 
Ex parte Milligan, a famous decision from the Civil War era, has 
shaped the vigorous debate regarding the proper treatment of al Qaeda 
affiliates within the United States.52  On the basis of an executive order, 
Milligan was arrested and tried before a military commission for 
conspiracy, inciting insurrection, aiding the rebels, and violating the laws 
of war.53  Milligan was alleged to have been a member of the Sons of 
Liberty, a secret society affiliated with the Confederacy that advocated 
governmental overthrow.54  Milligan argued that, as a resident of Indiana, 
he had never associated with a rebel state and thus could not have 
violated the laws of war.55  The Supreme Court held that Milligan was a 
civilian and therefore entitled to trial by jury unless the courts were 
inoperable.56  If it would have been dangerous to leave him a free man 
because he had conspired against the government and incited rebellion, 
he should have been arrested and tried in the civilian courts.57 
Several judges in the al-Marri decisions have emphasized the 
similarities between Milligan and alleged al Qaeda operatives, arguing 
that the decision in Milligan forecloses any possibility of treating non-
state actors unaffiliated with a recognized military as “combatants.”58  
Milligan has been distinguished by others as inapplicable to the present 
situation in that Milligan did not associate with a rebel state or otherwise 
take part in hostilities and, unlike the war against al Qaeda, Congress 
never sanctioned the use of force against the Sons of Liberty.59  Indeed, 
                                                          
 51. Woolman, supra note 35, at 147–49. 
 52. See al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring) (comparing al-
Marri to Milligan).  The persuasiveness of Milligan has been called into question by the United 
States Supreme Court.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 n.27 (2006) (cautioning against 
reliance upon decisions from the Civil War era), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2234 (2008). 
 53. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866). 
 54. ELSEA, supra note 50, at 12. 
 55. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 7–8. 
 56. Id. at 78. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213, 230–31 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring) (comparing 
al-Marri to Milligan). 
 59. Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (Hudson, J., dissenting), vacated en banc per 
curiam sub nom. al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213; al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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the Supreme Court has recognized that Ex parte Quirin clarified the 
decision in Ex parte Milligan,60 leading some to the conclusion that 
Milligan is applicable only once it is determined that the individual 
cannot qualify as an enemy combatant.61 
D. The Status of Terrorist Organizations and Their Members Under the 
Laws of War 
The “laws of war,” from which the federal courts seek guidance,62 
consist primarily of the various international treaties addressing armed 
conflict as well as customary international law, built upon the customs 
and practices of states.63  The treaties relating to armed conflict consist of 
the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land (“Hague Convention”) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
additional protocols.64  Essentially repeating the requirements set forth in 
the Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions provide combatant 
immunity only in specified circumstances.65  Those who satisfy the 
                                                          
 60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004). 
 61. See, e.g., al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (discussing why Milligan is inapplicable to the determination of whether al-Marri qualifies as 
an enemy combatant). 
 62. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, 
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 63. Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who 
Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 54 (1996). 
 64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Hague Convention: 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, ch. 1, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. 
 65. Geneva Convention III, supra note 64, art. 4.  To qualify as a prisoner of war, the individual 
must have fallen into the power of the enemy and belong to one of six categories, including: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, [or] members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict . . . provided that 
such militias or volunteer corps . . . fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
Id. 
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criteria are “lawful combatants,” privileged to engage in hostilities 
without punishment for their actions.66  These individuals are entitled to 
prisoner of war status upon capture and may not be prosecuted for any 
hostile acts in conformity with the laws of war.67  If they have committed 
any violations of the laws of war (war crimes), they may be prosecuted 
for such acts by military commission.68 
Although the Geneva Conventions do not define “unlawful 
combatants” or “unprivileged belligerents,” it is widely understood by 
implication and tradition that combatants who violate the laws of war 
and individuals who engage in hostilities, but do not satisfy the Geneva 
Conventions’ criteria for combatant privilege, are “unlawful 
combatants.”69  Unlawful combatants are not entitled to prisoner of war 
status and may be tried by military commissions for their actions.70  The 
commentary to the 1949 Geneva Convention implies that unlawful 
combatants may be detained even after hostilities have ended.71 
The laws of war, therefore, clearly distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful belligerents.72  However, the military detainment of suspected 
terrorists post-September 11 has generated intense debate concerning the 
proper status and treatment of such individuals.73  The administration has 
taken the position that al Qaeda members and affiliates qualify as 
“unlawful combatants,” and therefore are not entitled to the protections 
accorded lawful combatants under Convention III or to those accorded 
civilians under Convention IV.74  Individuals acting on behalf of terrorist 
organizations certainly cannot qualify as “prisoners of war,” for they fail 
to satisfy the established criteria.75  However, the International 
                                                          
 66. Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 45, 45 (2003). 
 67. Id.  See also Mark David ‘Max’ Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: 
Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 19, 21 (2007). 
 68. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946) (upholding the authority of a military 
commission to prosecute a Japanese General for his failure to prevent Japanese troops from 
massacring thousands of civilians while stationed in the Philippines). 
 69. Dörmann, supra note 66, at 46; Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing “Enemy Combatants” and 
Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 1, 9 (2007). 
 70. See Woolman, supra note 35, at 161 (“‘Unlawful combatants,’ unlike lawful combatants, 
have traditionally been tried in front of military tribunals . . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 161–62. 
 72. See Dörmann, supra note 66, at 46. 
 73. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, “Unlawful Combatants”: The Law and Whether It Needs to be 
Revised, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 196, 197–98 (2003). 
 74. Id. at 196. 
 75. Al Qaeda is not a signatory to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its members therefore 
could not qualify as prisoners of war (lawful combatants) under Geneva Convention III.  Douglas 
Hass, Note, Crafting Military Commissions Post-Hamdan: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
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Committee of the Red Cross has taken the position that individuals not 
entitled to the protections accorded prisoners of war under Convention 
III necessarily fall within the ambit of Convention IV as civilians.76  The 
Commentary to Convention IV confirms this view: 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under 
international law; he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by 
the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or 
again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces . . . .  
There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside 
the law.77 
Additional classification issues arise from the distinction between 
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.78  
Although the law of international armed conflict distinguishes between 
lawful and unlawful combatants, the law of non-international armed 
conflict does not.79  Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions80 and Article 1(4) of Protocol 1, signed in 1977, establish 
the various conflicts which may be deemed “international” in character.81  
Only two forms of conflict could involve terrorist organizations: 
resistance to total or partial occupation and struggle for national 
liberation.82  Neither would apply to the general conflict against al 
Qaeda’s transnational network.83  The administration adamantly insists 
that the global nature of the war against al Qaeda qualifies it as an 
international armed conflict.84  However, the Supreme Court held in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the conflict against al Qaeda in Afghanistan is 
                                                                                                                       
82 IND. L.J. 1101, 1106–07 (2007).  Moreover, al Qaeda affiliates refuse to comply with the laws of 
war and therefore would not satisfy the established criteria for combatant immunity.  Id. at 1113–14. 
 76. Dörmann, supra note 66, at 49; Honigsberg, supra note 69, at 16. 
 77. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, art. 4 cmt., at 51 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Commentary], available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/com/380-600007?OpenDocument. 
 78. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal 
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 893 (2002) (discussing the implications of numerous states and 
nationalities being involved in terrorism and conflicts); Hass, supra note 75, at 1106–10 (discussing 
the debate over whether the conflict with al Qaeda qualifies as international or non-international). 
 79. Dörmann, supra note 66, at 47; Sassòli, supra note 73, at 197. 
 80. Geneva Convention III, supra note 64, art. 2. 
 81. Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 1(4). 
 82. Id.; Daphné Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Force, 56 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2007).  Moreover, al Qaeda members refuse to comply with the laws 
of war and thus would not satisfy the established criteria for combatant immunity.  Id. 
 83. The conflict with al Qaeda in particular geographic areas could, however, qualify as 
“international armed conflict” on the basis of struggle against occupation.  For instance, al Qaeda 
operates on occupied territory in Iraq.  Richemond, supra note 82, at 1014. 
 84. Sassòli, supra note 73, at 196. 
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a non-international armed conflict,85 seemingly rejecting the 
administration’s characterization of the war on a more global scale as 
well. 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II 
govern non-international armed conflict.86  Under Article 1(1) of 
Protocol II, a conflict may be deemed non-international in nature only if 
it satisfies certain criteria.87  In particular, the conflict must take place “in 
the territory of a [state] between its armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of [a state’s] territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”88  
It seems problematic to apply this definition to various aspects of the war 
against al Qaeda.89  However, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
appeared to adopt the view that any conflict not qualifying as an 
international armed conflict should be considered a non-international 
armed conflict, governed by Common Article 3.90 
E. The Judicial and Congressional Response 
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court recognized the President’s 
authority under the AUMF to detain an American citizen fighting 
alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.91  The Court determined that 
Hamdi qualified as an “enemy combatant” because he was “part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in 
Afghanistan and “engaged in an armed conflict against the United 
States.”92  Recognizing the debate over the proper scope of the term 
“enemy combatant,” the Court left to the lower courts the task of 
delineating its “permissible bounds.”93 
                                                          
 85. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–29 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 
18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2234 (2008). 
 86. Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1(1); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 64, art. 3.  The 
United States has not ratified the additional protocols.  Honigsberg, supra note 69, at 17. 
 87. Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1(1). 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. See Richemond, supra note 82, at 1015. 
 90. Id. at 1017 n.72. 
 91. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
 92. Id. at 526. 
 93. Id. at 522 n.1. 
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2. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 
In 2006, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act (MCA) as 
a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.94  
The MCA delineates between lawful and unlawful enemy combatants.  A 
lawful enemy combatant is defined in accordance with the provisions set 
forth for prisoner of war classification in the Third Geneva Convention.95  
An unlawful enemy combatant is defined as: 
 (i)  A person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully 
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person 
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or 
 (ii)  A person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an 
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or 
another competent tribunal established under the authority of the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.96 
The MCA authorizes military commissions to try alien unlawful 
enemy combatants for any offenses therein or any violations of the law 
of war.97  It also amends the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide 
military tribunals with jurisdiction over the offenses of “conspiracy” and 
“providing material support for terrorism.”98  It additionally purports to 
strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of alien enemy 
combatants; however, the Court has deemed this an unconstitutional 
attempt to suspend the writ.99 
                                                          
 94. Hass, supra note 75, at 1102.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded 
by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in 
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2234 (2008). 
 95. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2) (2006); Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 64, art. 4. 
 96. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 948a(1). 
 97. Id. § 948b(a), 948c. 
 98. Id. § 950v(b)(25), (28).  But see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603–04 (refusing to recognize 
“conspiracy” as a violation of the laws of war). 
 99. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 950j(b); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274. 
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3. The Sleeper Scenario: al-Marri v. Wright 
a. The Rapp Declaration 
According to the information obtained by the government, al-Marri 
traveled to the United Arab Emirates after meeting with Bin Laden in the 
summer of 2001.100  Al Qaeda financier Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi met 
him at the Dubai airport and provided him with $10,000 to $13,000 and 
an additional $3000 to purchase a laptop.101  Al-Marri moved to Peoria, 
Illinois, purportedly to obtain a graduate degree in computer science at 
Bradley University.102  He had not contacted the school about 
commencing his studies until July of 2001 and the school felt that he was 
in a rush to begin.103  Within a few months, al-Marri rarely attended 
classes and was failing his courses.104 
At various times after September 11, al-Marri used calling cards to 
attempt to reach al-Hawsawi, who had provided logistical support for the 
September 11 attacks and assisted the hijackers in obtaining funds while 
in the U.S.105  Al-Marri had also established several e-mail accounts, 
some of which were later found to contain draft e-mail messages written 
to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind behind the attacks on 
September 11.106  The messages contained coded versions of al-Marri’s 
cell phone number.107 
Moreover, al-Marri had been conducting significant research during 
his time in Peoria on the use of dangerous chemicals.108  Several sites 
were found bookmarked, including links to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) homepage and to a website listing 
“Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health” chemical concentrations.109  
Other websites visited included “The Manufacture of Hydrogen 
Cyanide,” containing step-by-step instructions; “Cyanide Poisoning and 
Cyanide Antidotes”; and “Toxicity Profiles: Cyanides.”110  According to 
                                                          
 100. Rapp Declaration, supra note 2, at 5–6.  Al-Marri allegedly traveled to the United Arab 
Emirates in August 2001.  Id. 
 101. Id. at 6–7. 
 102. Id. at 5. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 6, 11. 
 106. Id. at 8–9. 
 107. Id. at 9. 
 108. Id. at 7–8. 
 109. Id. at 7. 
 110. Id. at 7–8. 
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the government, al-Marri’s research was consistent with al Qaeda’s 
known interest in the use of cyanides, particularly hydrogen cyanide.111 
b. The District Court Ruling 
A district court in South Carolina determined that the government’s 
allegations against al-Marri sufficed to detain him as an enemy 
combatant.112  Although the district court observed that Hamdi addressed 
when an individual supports hostile forces in Afghanistan, it reasoned 
that the Supreme Court did not intend to limit Hamdi to traditional 
battlefield situations.113  Al-Marri could therefore remain detained on the 
basis of the government’s allegations, as he had refused to offer evidence 
rebutting the allegations when offered the opportunity.114 
c. The Fourth Circuit Panel Opinion 
However, a majority of a Fourth Circuit panel determined that the 
military could not detain al-Marri.115  After concluding that the 
jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act did not 
apply to al-Marri,116 the panel addressed two specific arguments 
regarding the President’s authority to detain.  First, the government 
asserted that the AUMF empowers the President to detain enemy 
combatants.117  Second, the government argued that, even if the AUMF 
could not be so construed, the President has the inherent constitutional 
authority to detain.118  Rather than address the “serious constitutional 
questions” such arguments purportedly raised, the majority of the panel 
                                                          
 111. Id. at 7.  Al Qaeda instructed its members on the use of hydrogen cyanide at training camps 
in Afghanistan.  Id. at 8. 
 112. Al-Marri I, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 784 (2006), rev’d per curiam en banc sub nom. al-Marri 
III, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 113. See id. at 780 (“It is clear, then, that the term ‘enemy combatant’ is not limited to the 
definition used in Hamdi.”). 
 114. Id. at 784. 
 115. Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 184 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc per curiam sub nom. al-
Marri III, 534 F.3d 213. 
 116. The MCA purports to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions once an 
alien detainee has “been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”  Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d at 168.  The panel 
determined that this provision requires an initial decision, such as an executive order, as well as a 
subsequent determination of the propriety of the initial decision.  Id. at 170.  As no subsequent 
determination occurred and al-Marri was not awaiting it, the jurisdiction-stripping provision did not 
apply.  Id. at 172–73. 
 117. Id. at 174. 
 118. Id. at 177. 
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determined that al-Marri could not be classified as an enemy 
combatant.119  Relying upon Ex parte Quirin and Ex parte Milligan, the 
court held that enemy combatant status “rests on an individual’s 
affiliation during wartime with the ‘military arm of the enemy 
government.’”120  As al-Marri had never stood alongside the Taliban, 
taken up arms in Afghanistan, or engaged in direct, armed hostilities 
against United States forces, the majority believed he could not qualify 
as an “enemy combatant.”121 
d. The Fourth Circuit En Banc Opinion 
On July 15, 2008, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, issued a per 
curiam opinion addressing the authority of the executive to detain al-
Marri as an enemy combatant.122  It determined that the AUMF 
empowers the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant, 
provided the government’s allegations against al-Marri are true.123  
However, the court also determined that al-Marri had “not been afforded 
sufficient process to challenge his designation as an enemy 
combatant.”124  The opinions of the judges were expressed in several 
separately written opinions. 
In an opinion joined by three other judges, Judge Motz elucidated 
further upon her argument that al-Marri cannot qualify as an enemy 
combatant as he did not affiliate “with the armed forces of an enemy 
nation.”125  Judge Motz relied upon the purportedly narrow ruling in 
Hamdi as well as the legislative history of the AUMF in concluding that 
neither the Supreme Court nor Congress intended to permit the detention 
of those lawfully residing within the U.S. at the time of capture.126  Judge 
Motz pointed to the Patriot Act as conclusive evidence that Congress 
intended to treat alien suspected terrorists as criminals rather than 
combatants, subject to temporary administrative detention but not to 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 178. 
 120. Id. at 181 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942)). 
 121. See id. at 183 (“[A]l-Marri is not alleged to have been part of a Taliban unit, not alleged to 
have stood alongside the Taliban or the armed forces of any other enemy nation, not alleged to have 
been on a battlefield during the war in Afghanistan, not alleged to have even been in Afghanistan 
during the armed conflict there, and not alleged to have engaged in combat with United States forces 
anywhere in the world.”). 
 122. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 123. Id. at 216. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 230 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 229, 239–40. 
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extended military confinement.127  After considering the international 
standards for combatant status, Judge Motz concluded that an individual 
may not be classified as an enemy combatant merely for engaging in 
criminal conduct.128 
In a separate opinion, Judge Wilkinson strongly disagreed with the 
conclusion reached by Judge Motz, noting that while the broad language 
of the AUMF could present difficult issues for determining the 
permissibility of detaining certain categories of individuals, al-Marri’s 
case “fits squarely within the bounds of the AUMF” because Congress 
enacted the AUMF in response to the targeting of U.S. civilians on 
American soil rather than upon a foreign battlefield.129  After critiquing 
the plurality approach as a violation of the “separation of powers” 
doctrine, Judge Wilkinson proposed a definition of “enemy combatant,” 
understanding Hamdi as explicit authorization for the lower courts to 
engage in such an analysis.  Judge Wilkinson set forth the following 
definition of an “enemy combatant” for purposes of the war against 
terrorism: an enemy combatant is one “who is (1) a member of (2) an 
organization or nation against whom Congress has declared war or 
authorized the use of military force” (3) “who knowingly plans or 
engages in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for 
the purpose of furthering the military goals of an enemy nation or 
organization.”130 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Traditional “Enemy Combatant” Concept Must be Broadened to 
Encompass Al Qaeda Agents Engaging in or Preparing for Hostile 
Acts Within the United States 
The attacks on September 11 ushered in a new age in warfare, an age 
in which the “enemy” may no longer be conceptualized in reference to a 
particular geographic region and distinctions between “civilians” and 
“combatants” blur.  Al Qaeda’s “soldiers” move through the shadows, 
blending into civilian society in anticipation of the moment of attack.  
                                                          
 127. Id. at 248–49.  Judge Wilkinson disagreed that the Patriot Act carries any relevance, noting 
that the two “have different spheres of operation,” the Patriot Act being inapplicable until after it has 
been demonstrated that the individual does not qualify as an “enemy combatant.”  Id. at 301–02 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 128. Id. at 233, 235 (Motz, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. at 298, 300 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130. Id. at 323–24. 
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The traditional war paradigm, an antiquated state-based model,131 fails to 
provide an adequate response to such subversive activity.  However, the 
United States is engaged in a war against al Qaeda—a war sanctioned by 
Congress.  The treatment of suspected al Qaeda members within our 
borders must reflect these new realities. 
1. Al Qaeda Agents Acting Within the United States Create a Grave 
Security Risk 
No longer does it take an army of several thousand acting in concert 
to seriously threaten another nation’s political sovereignty—modern 
technology has armed individual terrorists with the “power to bring a 
state to its knees.”132  Given the grave security risk presented by al Qaeda 
members actively working from within the United States, it is critical 
that the military be capable of detaining such individuals in order to 
prevent the recurrence of a large-scale terrorist attack.  It makes little 
sense from a security standpoint to classify al Qaeda agents as 
“civilians,” rather than “combatants,” merely because they happened to 
be captured closer to their target.  For instance, the panel opinion in al-
Marri II would have prevented the military detention of those directly 
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center.133  Such a result 
seems clearly at odds with the avowed intent of the government to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism upon U.S. soil and fails 
to account for the modern realities of warfare.  Although terrorism has 
always existed, modern terrorism has “emerged as a strategy of 
revolutionary struggle only in the period after World War II.”134  Modern 
terrorists potentially have access to weapons of mass destruction and 
intentionally target civilian infrastructure, creating a limitless 
“battlefield.”  In addition, they purposely blend into civilian society and 
thereby render the traditional indicia of a “combatant,” such as a 
uniform, “woefully unreflective of the risks . . . .”135 
Al Qaeda’s militant and hierarchical nature compounds the threat in 
a manner inapplicable to “Islamic terrorism” generally.  Al Qaeda has 
long considered itself at war with the United States, declaring so 
                                                          
 131. See id. at 316; Richemond, supra note 82, at 1001. 
 132. Peter Berkowitz, Introduction, in TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION, at ix (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005). 
 133. See al-Mari III, 534 F.3d at 297 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 134. Id. at 321 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 198 (3d ed. 2000)).  
Walzer defines such “modern terrorism” as “the random murder of innocent people.”  WALZER, 
supra, at 198. 
 135. Id. 
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numerous times prior to the attacks on September 11.136  It trains its 
“soldiers” at camps, allegedly circulating “military manuals” that 
describe such matters as the principles of military organization, security 
precautions for its “command centers” within targeted cities, the 
purchase and transport of weapons, the proper means of engaging in 
espionage, recruitment of foreign intelligence agents, methods of 
assassination, and methods of detonating explosives.137  Moreover, it is 
believed that al Qaeda retains important characteristics of an organized 
entity “with a central command and control structure,” including a core 
leadership that coordinates attacks, surveillance, and planning 
operations.138  Indeed, al Qaeda’s extensive structure and scope of 
operations makes it nearly indistinguishable from a de facto government: 
[It] has a standing army; it has a treasury and a consistent source of 
revenue; it has a permanent civil service; it has an intelligence 
collection and analysis cadre; it even runs a rudimentary welfare 
program for its fighters, and their relatives and associates.  It has a 
recognizable hierarchy of officials; it makes alliances with other states; 
it promulgates laws, which it enforces ruthlessly; it declares wars.139 
2. The United States Is “At War” With Al Qaeda 
The split of opinion in the Fourth Circuit over the proper treatment 
of al Qaeda affiliates captured within the United States is indicative of a 
weightier question regarding the ability of a sovereign nation to engage 
in “warfare” with a non-state actor such as al Qaeda.  The position taken 
by Judge Motz reflects the view of commentators who have argued that 
the war against “terrorism” or particular transnational terrorist 
organizations (including al Qaeda) must be metaphorical only, similar to 
a war on drugs or a war on crime.140  The proffered rationale is that a 
                                                          
 136. Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the 
Two Holy Places, August 1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_ 
1996.html; Osama bin Laden, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Feb. 23, 1998, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html. 
 137. AL QAEDA TRAINING MANUAL, MILITARY STUDIES IN THE JIHAD AGAINST THE TYRANTS, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).  The manual was found by 
the police in Manchester, England, during a search of an al Qaeda member’s home.  Id. at 1. 
 138. Hoffman statement, supra note 26; Mueller statement, supra note 23.  For a description of 
al Qaeda’s structure, see Jessica Erin Tannenbaum, Comment, Fighting the War on Terrorism with 
the Legal System: A Defense of Military Commissions, 11 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 83 
(2005). 
 139. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 300 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing PHILIP BOBBIT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 820 (2002)). 
 140. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on 
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conflict with a terrorist organization could never rise to the level of 
“warfare,” as a state of war can exist only between sovereign nations or 
within the context of an internal rebellion.141  However, Congress 
conferred full authority under the AUMF to prosecute a war against non-
traditional actors.142  Moreover, treatment of the war domestically and 
internationally indicates a general acceptance of the idea that warfare 
may occur between states and non-state actors such as al Qaeda. 
Congress chose to treat the attacks on September 11 as acts of war in 
enacting the AUMF.  The statutory text itself indicates Congress’s clear 
intent to engage military force against a non-state organization: the 
AUMF explicitly authorizes the use of force against “organizations” and 
“persons.”143  Moreover, the legislative history of the AUMF 
demonstrates that members of Congress were aware of the implications 
of a decision to authorize unconventional warfare.  For instance, Senator 
Kohl noted that “the Senate has taken a somber step toward a new kind 
of war.  Congress has resolved that military force may be necessary to 
end the scourge of terrorism.”144 
Indeed, the AUMF confers upon the President authority comparable 
to that provided in declared wars.145  Recent research by scholars Curtis 
A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith demonstrates that a formal declaration 
of war is unnecessary to confer full authority to prosecute the war on 
terror and the AUMF’s broad terms indeed provide such authority.146  
Given that several undeclared wars occurred before ratification of the 
Constitution, the founders likely did not view a formal declaration as a 
constitutional requirement for the President to engage in hostilities.147  
Moreover, historical practice has confirmed that Congress may fully 
empower the President to engage in war within the bounds of the 
                                                                                                                       
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346–47 (2002) (describing the post-September 11 war as 
“metaphorical” because a state of war cannot exist between the United States and al Qaeda under 
international notions of warfare); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 759, 760–61 (2007) (arguing that the United States cannot be at war with al Qaeda under 
internationally accepted notions of warfare or armed conflict). 
 141. See Paust, supra note 140 at 760–61. 
 142. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2066–71 (2005). 
 143. See al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 196 (4th Cir. 2007) (Hudson, J., dissenting), vacated en banc 
per curium sub nom. al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213. 
 144. 147 CONG. REC. 17,038 (2001) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
 145. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 142, at 2054. 
 146. Id. at 2058–62. 
 147. The numerous undeclared wars prior to the ratification of the Constitution led to a comment 
in the Federalist Papers that “‘the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into 
disuse.’”  Id. at 2058–59 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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authorization.148  Beginning in the late 1700s, the United States began to 
engage in hostilities without official declarations of war and Congress 
has relied upon authorizations for the use of force to confer authority in 
every conflict since World War II.149  The War Powers Resolution, 
enacted in 1973, “expressly envisions that authorizations to use force can 
serve as the vehicle for the initiation of war by the United States.”150  The 
AUMF explicitly states that it is intended to constitute authorization 
“within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”151  
Moreover, the broad scope of the AUMF in comparison to prior 
authorizations indicates Congress’s intent to confer authority as broad as 
that granted during declared wars.152  It would therefore be inaccurate to 
conclude that Congress’s decision to authorize force under the AUMF 
rather than pursuant to an official declaration of war somehow truncates 
the President’s powers or demonstrates that Congress did not really 
intend to “declare war” against a non-state actor. 
Moreover, the various governmental branches have subsequently 
treated the conflict against al Qaeda as a war.  President Bush 
immediately stated that the attacks qualified as an “armed conflict,”153 
then subsequently described that conflict as a “war.”154  The Supreme 
Court implicitly upheld the characterization of the attacks as an act of 
war in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld by recognizing that the AUMF sanctioned the 
President’s execution of the war in Afghanistan.155  In addition to 
enacting clarifying legislation such as the MCA, Congress has 
appropriated billions for use in the war on terrorism, the detention of 
suspected terrorists as enemy combatants, and military commissions.156 
Treating al Qaeda’s affiliates as enemy combatants seems a practical 
implication of the political determination that the attacks qualified as acts 
                                                          
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2059. 
 150. Id. at 2060. 
 151. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., § 2(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 
1541 (2001). 
 152. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 142, at 2072–83.  For instance, the AUMF contains no 
limitations on targets save for the “nations, organizations, or persons” the President determines had a 
sufficient nexus to the attacks on September 11.  Id. at 2080. Moreover, it does not impose 
limitations on the resources the President may use to fight the war nor confine the fighting to a 
particular geographic region.  Id. at 2081.  The AUMF is indeed broader than prior authorizations in 
that it does not name the enemy specifically and authorizes the President to identify the enemy.  Id. 
at 2081 n.141. 
 153. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 154. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 142. 
 155. 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).  See also Berkowitz, supra note 132, at 71. 
 156. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 142, at 2070. 
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of war.  The broad language of the AUMF does not geographically limit 
the President’s authority to detain and therefore certainly seems to 
encompass “surreptitious al Qaeda agents operating within the 
continental United States.”157  Judge Motz disagreed, concluding that the 
legislative history of the AUMF demonstrates Congress intended to 
provide the President the authority to act abroad but not to detain those 
within the United States.158  This position directly contradicts the 
language of the AUMF as well as the clear congressional purpose in 
granting such authority: to reach those similarly situated to the 9/11 
actors and thereby prevent the recurrence of another destructive attack.159 
The power to determine when a state of war exists has been vested in 
Congress alone.160  Judicial interference with such determinations 
undermines one of the most fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system: separation of powers.161  As once noted by the Supreme Court: 
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial.  Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive 
and Legislative . . . .  They are and should be undertaken only by those 
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or 
imperil.  They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither the aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been 
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry.162 
                                                          
 157. Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 196 (4th Cir. 2007) (Hudson, J., dissenting), vacated en banc per 
curiam sub nom. al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 158. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 239–40 (Motz, J., concurring).  Judge Motz recounts that prior to 
the Senate vote on the AUMF, the administration sought to insert the words “in the United States” 
after “appropriate force” to provide the President authority not just overseas but also in the United 
States, potentially against American citizens.  Id.  The Senate rejected the proposed language.  Id.  
Judge Motz also pointed to the following statement of Senator Biden as evidence Congress did not 
intend to authorize the detention of those acting from within the United States: “In extending this 
broad authority to cover those ‘planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the attacks,’ it should go 
without saying, however, that the resolution is directed only at using force abroad to combat acts of 
international terrorism.”  Id. (citing 147 Cong. Rec. 17,047 (2001) (statement of Sen. Biden)). 
 159. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i) (2006) (defining an 
“unlawful enemy combatant” as an individual “who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who 
is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or 
associated forces)”). 
 160. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 161. See al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 294 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[O]ur Constitution is a feat of architecture as well as a charter of cherished rights.  To overlook the 
constitutional allocation of authority to Congress and the President in this case is to replace the 
Framers’ design with our own precarious arrangements.”). 
 162. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
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The power of Congress to declare war must not be subject to a limiting 
judicial definition of “warfare.”  As Alexander Hamilton once 
emphasized, congressional and executive powers must remain flexible in 
the face of phenomenal changes in warfare: 
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible 
to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and 
the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be 
necessary to satisfy them.  The circumstances that endanger the safety 
of the nation are infinite . . . .  This power ought to be coextensive with 
all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be 
under the direction of the same councils, which are appointed to preside 
over the common defense.163 
B. Law of War Principles Provide Guidance in Defining and Limiting 
Combatant Status 
The advent of international terrorism as a form of “armed attack” 
sufficient to initiate warfare has resulted in a vigorous debate regarding 
the appropriate classification of culpable individuals under international 
law.  The applicable legal norms were crafted over centuries of warfare 
between states and thus largely rest upon antiquated assumptions.164  
Professor Daphné Richemond identifies one of these assumptions as the 
belief that civilians and combatants fall into clearly distinguishable 
groups.165  In a war against a transnational terrorist organization, the 
traditional indicia of group membership, like uniforms or open bearing of 
arms, will not apply, as the “enemy” will intentionally blend into civilian 
society.  The difficulty, then, is in delineating between affiliates of the 
enemy—“combatants”—and “civilians.”  The executive and legislative 
branches have taken the position that mere association with or support to 
the enemy organization is sufficient to render one an “enemy 
combatant.”166  Under this approach, unintentional acts clearly 
insufficient under traditional norms to confer “combatant” status may 
result in extended military confinement.  A nation committed to the 
protection of civil liberties must demand a more rigorous standard.  In 
                                                          
 163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 164. Daphné Richemond describes three assumptions upon which traditional warfare rested: that 
states alone engage in warfare, that civilians and combatants fall into clearly distinguishable groups, 
and that parties to a conflict (states) act on the basis of reciprocity.  Richemond, supra note 82, at 
1002–03. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006). 
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order to determine the proper approach, the following section will 
consider the historical basis for distinguishing between combatants and 
civilians.  It will then analyze how states have distinguished between 
combatants and civilians in practice as a basis for establishing principled 
limits upon the application of the “enemy combatant” label to suspected 
terrorists. 
1. The Historical Rationales for Distinguishing Combatants from 
Civilians Support Classification of Al Qaeda Members as 
Combatants 
The distinction between combatants and civilians pre-existed the 
Geneva Conventions.  Several ancient legal codes prohibited the 
targeting of women or children and sought to distinguish between 
“soldiers” and “others.”167  Esteemed writers such as Francisco de 
Vitoria and Hugo Grotius—the father of modern international law—
likewise espoused the need for distinction.168  In 1863, the American 
jurist Francis Lieber drafted the influential Lieber Code—a guide for 
determining who qualified as an “ordinary belligerent” during the Civil 
War.169  Lieber insisted upon the protection of the “inoffensive 
individual,” the unarmed citizen.170  The Lieber Code’s distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants served as the basis for later 
twentieth century codifications: “‘[a]ll enemies in regular war are 
divided into two general classes—that is to say, into combatants and 
noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.’”171 
The historical foundation for distinguishing between combatants and 
civilians stemmed from the idea that certain persons are presumed 
innocent and thus should not be targeted.172  For instance, Francisco de 
                                                          
 167. Richemond, supra note 82, at 1017.  For instance, the Chinese distinguished between 
“soldiers” and “people” and the Old Testament urged soldiers “to spare women and children.”  Id.  
The Hellenes understood “‘that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the 
many are their friends’” and were to refrain from assuming that “‘the whole population of a city—
men, women, and children—are equally their enemies.’”  Id. at 1017–18 (quoting 1 LEON 
FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR 5 (1972)). 
 168. Id. at 1018. 
 169. Id. at 1018–20.  Lieber drafted the Code for General Henry Wager Halleck, General-in-
Chief of the Union Armies during the Civil War.  Halleck commissioned the Code “because he was 
confused about who could be considered an ‘ordinary belligerent,’ and worried about the 
consequences of capture for his own men.”  Id. at 1019. 
 170. Id. at 1019. 
 171. Id. at 1019–20 (quoting Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, art. 155, Apr. 24, 1863, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL 
/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code]). 
 172. Id. at 1027. 
07.0_ELMORE_FINAL 10/27/2008  4:33:14 PM 
238 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
Vitoria stated “‘[I]t is never lawful in itself intentionally to kill innocent 
persons . . . .  It follows that . . . we may not kill children, who are 
obviously innocent, nor women, who are to be presumed innocent.’”173  
However, even Vitoria recognized that an innocent person could become 
a legitimate target when he took up arms.174  In other words, the 
determinative point at which one could be deemed a “combatant” was 
when he took up arms against the enemy.175  As discussed below, this 
concept has not only been interwoven into the practice of states in 
warfare, but has also been incorporated into modern treaties on warfare.  
Similarly, this concept may serve as a distinguishing factor in 
determining combatant status even in unconventional warfare against 
stateless actors.  In particular, those associated with the enemy 
organization may be deemed combatants or non-combatants depending 
upon the degree to which such individuals have actively engaged in 
hostilities in contravention of international norms.176 
2. State Practice and the “Laws of War” Confirm that Civilians 
Actively Engaging in Hostilities Qualify as Combatants 
Association has traditionally served as the primary indicator of 
combatant status.  Thus, all residents of the hostile nation were deemed 
“enemies” during warfare while combatant status relied primarily upon 
one’s membership in the armed forces.177  This traditional conception of 
combatant status led to the position espoused in al-Marri II  that the only 
individuals capable of qualifying as “unlawful combatants” are otherwise 
lawful combatants who have lost their privilege to engage in warfare by 
violating the laws of war.178  Under this interpretation, individuals may 
be deemed “unlawful combatants” only when affiliated with the 
“military arm” of a recognized government.  Although such individuals 
                                                          
 173. Id. at 1028 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 293, 
314–15 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942); Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 
194 (1875); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946)). 
 178. See al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 186 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc per curiam sub nom. 
al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213 (“To be sure, enemy combatants may commit crimes just as civilians can.  
When an enemy combatant violates the law of war, that conduct will render the person an unlawful 
enemy combatant, subject not only to detention but also to military trial and punishment.”); al-Marri 
III, 534 F.3d at 235 (Motz, J., concurring) (“[M]erely engaging in unlawful behavior does not make 
one an enemy combatant.”). 
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certainly qualify as “unlawful combatants,”179 the laws of war have long 
recognized that an individual may be deemed an “unlawful belligerent” 
even when unaffiliated with the military forces of the enemy state.180 
An international treatise written during the Second World War 
explained when this may occur: 
Private individuals who take up arms and commit hostilities against the 
enemy do not enjoy the privileges of armed forces, and the enemy has, 
according to a customary rule of International Law, the right to treat 
such individuals as war criminals.  But they cease to be private 
individuals if they organize themselves in a manner which, according to 
the Hague Convention, confers upon them the status of members of 
regular forces.181 
The United States has also engaged in the practice of treating civilians as 
“unlawful combatants” based upon their active participation in 
hostilities.  During the Civil War, the instructions for Union Soldiers 
regarding the treatment of individuals who engaged in belligerency 
without the privilege to do so were as follows: “[m]en, or squads of men, 
who commit hostilities . . . without being part and portion of the 
organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, . . . 
if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall 
be treated summarily . . . .”182  Nearly one hundred years later, the United 
States Military Tribunal at Nuremburg stated that “‘the rule is established 
that a civilian who aids, abets or participates in the fighting is liable to 
punishment as a war criminal under the law of wars.  Fighting is 
legitimate only for the combatant personnel of a country.’”183 
The Geneva Conventions implicitly embraced the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful combatants,184 as well as the idea that 
civilians may become “unlawful combatants” by actively engaging in 
hostilities.  For instance, Geneva Convention IV excludes certain 
                                                          
 179. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946). 
 180. Owen Fiss, Law is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 256, 265 (2007); Jean-François Quéguiner, 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 8–9 (Program on 
Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard Univ., Working Paper, 2003), available at 
http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/briefing3297.pdf; Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Darin 
R. Bartram, Unlawful Belligerency and its Implications Under International Law (2005), 
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.104/pub_detail.asp. 
 181. Casey et al., supra note 180 (citing 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (6th 
ed. 1940)). 
 182. Lieber Code, supra note 171, art. 82. 
 183. Quéguiner, supra note 180, at 10 n.40 (quoting UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 111 (1997)). 
 184. Casey et al., supra note 180. 
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individuals from enjoying the full protections accorded civilians—or 
“protected persons”: 
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied 
that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or 
engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual 
person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the 
present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such 
individual person, be prejudicial to the Security of such State.185 
Article 5 proceeds to list the minimal rights to be afforded such 
individuals: 
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, 
and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and 
regular trial prescribed by the present Convention.  They shall also be 
granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the 
present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of 
the State . . . .186 
The drafters of the Convention inserted Article 5 to address the status 
of civilians who directly participated in hostilities.  They did not want to 
provide such individuals with the full protections accorded to prisoners 
of war as they failed to comply with the requirements for such status.187  
Nor did the drafters want to afford such individuals with the protections 
provided to innocent civilians as they had violated the laws of war by 
engaging in combat without privilege to do so.188  For example, the 
British delegate stated that the Civilian Convention was intended to 
protect “‘civilian victims of war’” and not to protect “‘illegitimate 
bearers of arms, who could not expect full protection under rules of war 
to which they did not conform.’”189  The delegate from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that the Conventions did not 
protect irregular belligerents, as it was uncertain whether “‘persons who 
did not conform to the laws and customs of war’” should be provided 
protection, but that the drafters inserted Article 5 nonetheless to accord 
minimal protection and thus prevent the summary execution of such 
individuals.190  Therefore, the laws of war relating to international armed 
                                                          
 185. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 64, art. 5 (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Dörmann, supra note 66, at 53. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 53 n.19 (quoting 2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1949, at 
621). 
 190. Id. at 53 (quoting 2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1949, at 433). 
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conflict clearly delineate between combatants and civilians not only 
based on the affiliation of such individuals with the military branch of 
the enemy state but also, in the absence of such affiliation, whether the 
individuals have impermissibly engaged in hostile acts. 
The Supreme Court’s determination that the war against al Qaeda 
qualifies as “non-international” raises questions more technical than 
substantive in form regarding whether civilians engaging in hostilities in 
a non-international armed conflict may also be deemed “unlawful 
combatants.”  In 2005, the ICRC published an official statement 
espousing the view that, in non-international armed conflicts, combatant 
status simply does not exist.191  In holding that al-Marri could not qualify 
as a combatant, the panel majority accepted this statement as 
authoritative.192  However, Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the related commentary demonstrate that even in non-
international armed conflicts, an individual may be considered a 
combatant if he directly participates in hostilities.  Common Article 3 
distinguishes between those taking an active part in hostilities and those 
not doing so: “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely . . . .”193  The protections of 
Common Article 3 therefore apply only to those “taking no active part in 
hostilities.”194  In addition, Common Article 3 applies to “armed 
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities”195—the 
notion of “armed conflict” necessarily implying the existence of 
combatants.  The proposition that a civilian engaging in hostilities may 
be deemed a combatant even in a non-international armed conflict is 
supported by the historical purposes for distinguishing between 
combatants and civilians: to protect the innocent and punish those 
engaging in warfare without privilege to do so. 
The “active participation in hostilities” standard should assist in 
guiding the determination of whether suspected terrorists qualify as 
“combatants.”  Of course, because the nature of warfare has changed, the 
classification must no longer rely upon “quaint and out-moded” concepts 
such as enemy states, residency, and “demarcated foreign battlefields.”196  
                                                          
 191. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT: THE RELEVANCE OF IHL IN THE 
CONTEXT OF TERRORISM (Feb. 21, 2005), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall 
/terrorism-ihl-210705. 
 192. Al-Marri II, 487 F.3d 160, 185 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc per curiam sub nom. al-
Marri III, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 193. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 64, art. 3. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Geneva Conventions Commentary, supra note 77. 
 196. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Nonetheless, the traditional treatment of actively hostile civilians during 
warfare demonstrates that the focus of classification in unconventional 
situations should be not merely upon the conventional “associational” 
aspect, but more importantly, upon the individual’s relevant conduct. 
3. Direct Participation in Hostilities Encompasses Espionage and 
Preparation for Acts of Sabotage 
Since September 11, the question of whether terrorist acts can 
qualify as “direct participation in hostilities” has been vigorously debated 
within the international community.197  The ICRC has hosted meetings of 
experts from around the globe to consider the precise meaning of the 
standard.198  Interestingly, the ICRC noted in its report that no opposition 
was expressed to the idea that intelligence gathering could constitute a 
direct participation in hostilities.199  Other commentators have insisted 
that the phrase “hostilities” has commonly been interpreted as 
encompassing preparation for attack.200  Any activities undertaken in 
preparation for future attacks should therefore qualify as “participation” 
in hostilities, sufficient to confer “unlawful combatant” status. 
C. A Proper Balance 
Based on the principles and standards discussed in Part III, the term 
“enemy combatant” should be defined to include: 
 
(a) An individual who qualifies for prisoner of war status under 
the Third Geneva Convention; or 
(b) An individual who does not qualify for prisoner of war status 
under the Third Geneva Convention but who 
1. Is affiliated with a state or organization against which 
the United States is engaged in an authorized armed 
conflict; 
2. Engages in, aids and abets, or prepares to commit hostile 
acts against the United States or its co-belligerents; and 
                                                          
 197. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2003), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng 
/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205 (scroll down and follow “Summary report 
2003” hyperlink) (tracking the debate among experts attending the meeting). 
 198. See id. at 2. 
 199. Id. at 3. 
 200. Richemond, supra note 82, at 1022. 
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3. Acts with the intent thereby to harm the nation, its 
civilians, its economy, or its national security. 
 
An individual qualifying for prisoner of war status under the Geneva 
Convention III (a lawful combatant) may properly be subject to military 
detention until the end of hostilities pursuant to traditional international 
standards.  The individual, however, may not be tried by a military 
tribunal for his acts of hostility unless he has committed a violation of 
the laws of war.  An “unlawful enemy combatant,” or one who has 
engaged in hostilities without the privilege to do so, may be subject to 
military detention and trial for those acts which render his belligerency 
unlawful.201 
D. The Proposed Definition Comports with Due Process Standards 
Regardless of the ever-increasing levels of technological 
sophistication in warfare, a challenge, as old as warfare itself, remains 
for every civilized state: how are civil liberty interests to be weighed vis-
à-vis the need for order and military victory?  Due to political exigencies, 
the government has greater authority in time of war to engage in conduct 
potentially infringing upon civil liberties.202  It is the primary 
responsibility of the state to ensure the security and well-being of its 
inhabitants.  Yet civil liberties must not be permitted to erode to the point 
of jeopardizing the very freedoms upon which the political identity of the 
state is built.  Therefore, the proper parameters for the term “enemy 
combatant” must hinge not only upon the breadth of authority provided 
the executive to militarily detain suspected terrorists, but also upon 
whether the Constitution permits the executive to undertake such 
detentions.203  The following section addresses these concerns by 
exploring the rights owed to lawful residents or citizens of the United 
States during peace and when such rights may be deprived to ensure state 
security.  In addition, it will highlight the elements of the proposed 




                                                          
 201. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942). 
 202. REHNQUIST, supra note 1, at 218. 
 203. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213, 296 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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1. Recognized Derogations from the Protections of the Due Process 
Clause Support the Detention of Al Qaeda Operatives Working 
Surreptitiously Within the United States 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of 
law.204  The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[f]reedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”205  
The Fifth Amendment protection of “persons” extends to all those who 
have entered the United States and developed substantial connections 
within, regardless of whether they initially entered lawfully.206 
Yet the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is not 
absolute.  Important derogations have long been recognized in the 
interest of community safety.207  Therefore, the mentally ill may be 
civilly committed and recidivist sex offenders unable to control their 
criminal tendencies may be confined.208  Similarly, in times of military 
necessity, those qualifying as “enemy combatants” may be detained for 
the duration of hostilities.209  Prior to the September 11 attacks, the 
Supreme Court recognized that terrorist activity could qualify as a 
“special circumstance,” where arguments “might be made for forms of 
preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of 
the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”210 
The “combatant exception” to the due process requirement 
traditionally applied to those acting on behalf of a sovereign nation.  
However, the decision of Congress that al Qaeda affiliates qualify as 
                                                          
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 205. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992)). 
 206. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (explaining that aliens are 
entitled to the protections within the Due Process Clause when they “have come within the territory 
of the United States and developed substantial connections with the country.”); Matthews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 77–78 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or 
transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”). 
 207. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997). 
 208. Id. at 358. 
 209. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 n.1 (2004). 
 210. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.  In Zadvydas, the Court considered whether the Attorney 
General may indefinitely detain aliens who have already been ordered removed from the United 
States.  Id. at 682.  After recognizing that a statute authorizing indefinite detention of aliens would 
“raise serious constitutional concerns,” the Court interpreted the relevant statute as containing a 
reasonable time limitation.  Id.  Moreover, the Court insisted that the application of the reasonable 
time limitation be subject to review by the federal courts.  Id.  The Court distinguished the situation 
it faced from that presented by dangerous terrorists.  Id. at 695–96. 
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“combatants” is a constitutionally permissible exercise of its exclusive 
authority to declare the existence of hostilities.  Deference to this 
determination, as well as to the realities of modern warfare, requires an 
extension of the “combatant” exception to individuals actively engaging 
in hostile activity on behalf of such an organization.  This conclusion is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s position that terrorism could justify 
the preventive detention of demonstrably dangerous individuals such as 
al-Marri. 
Detainees are nonetheless entitled to certain procedural protections.  
A detainee must be provided “notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”211  A military tribunal may 
satisfy the “neutral decisionmaker” requirement.212  However, combatant 
detainees are entitled to judicial review of the grounds for detainment 
through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.213  Such procedural 
protections help to ensure that the detention of suspected terrorists will 
not result in indefinite confinement of innocent individuals. 
2. The Proposed Definition Permits the Executive to Ensure 
“Community Security” and Prevents Unjustifiable Intrusion upon 
Civil Liberties 
The precise contours of the proposed definition ensure a satisfactory 
balance between the security needs of the state and the protection of civil 
liberties.  By treating hostile al Qaeda members as “combatants,” the 
definition eliminates the risks inherent in applying a reactive policing 
model to suspected terrorists and recognizes that the “battlefield” in 
modern warfare extends beyond the area of active combat operations.  
The definition simultaneously prevents the encroachment of the military 
upon cherished civil liberties.  The key components include the 
following: (a) affiliation with an organization (b) with which the United 
                                                          
 211. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.  Hamdi addressed the status of a citizen detainee; however, lawful 
resident aliens should enjoy the same protections, particularly given the potential for executive 
overreaching and faulty determinations. 
 212. Id. at 538.  The military tribunal may permit hearsay evidence and the government may be 
entitled to an evidentiary presumption.  Id. at 533–34. 
 213. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262, 2274 (2008) (holding that “enemy 
combatants” detained in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, are entitled to petition for a writ of habeas and that 
Congress in enacting the Military Commissions Act unconstitutionally attempted to suspend the writ 
in relation to such individuals); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23–25 (1942) (upholding judicial 
review over the jurisdiction of military commissions established to try enemy saboteurs captured on 
U.S. soil, even though a presidential proclamation had attempted to strip the courts of habeas 
review). 
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States is engaged in an authorized armed conflict, and (c) actual 
engagement in or preparation for hostilities. 
a. Affiliation 
An Argentine general allegedly once declared: “First we will kill all 
of the terrorists; then we will kill all who helped them, and then we will 
kill all who did not help us.”214  The affiliation requirement ensures that 
the military detention of a few, culpable individuals will not result in the 
general’s infamous slippery slope.  It serves as the functional equivalent 
of the traditional “residency” element of combatant status in this new 
form of warfare against a stateless actor.215  It prevents the military 
detention of domestic “criminals,” such as Timothy McVeigh, as well as 
the increasing number of homegrown extremists inspired by but not 
affiliated with al Qaeda or a similar terrorist organization.216  Although 
independent, self-proclaimed terrorists certainly pose a threat to state 
security, 217 the threat from such individuals is “vastly different” than that 
from individuals directed and funded by al Qaeda because of al Qaeda’s 
superior attack capabilities.218  Moreover, the detention of those 
unaffiliated with al Qaeda or a terrorist organization demonstrably linked 
to al Qaeda cannot fall within the scope of authority granted under the 
AUMF as a necessary incident to the authorized use of force.219  The 
affiliation requirement therefore serves a vital function in limiting the 
scope of detentions permitted and may, as Judge Wilkinson suggested in 
al-Marri III, be effectuated by requiring such indicators as self-
identification or participation in hostile activities on behalf of the 
organization.220 
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 215. See al-Marri III, 534 F.3d 213, 314–15 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part 
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 219. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (permitting the detention of enemy 
combatants pursuant to the “necessary and appropriate” force authorized by Congress). 
 220. Al-Marri III, 534 F.3d at 315 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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b. The United States Must be Engaged in an Authorized Armed 
Conflict with the Organization 
Congress has authorized the use of force against “those nations, 
organizations, or persons” responsible for the attacks on September 11.221  
It certainly did not authorize the use of force against any and all 
transnational terrorist organizations.  Unfortunately, the executive seems 
not to have considered its authority under the AUMF to be so limited.  
The following statement made by President Bush on September 20, 
2001, is illustrative: “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and 
every government that supports them.  Our war . . . begins with al Qaeda, 
but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”222  Such sweeping 
assertions of authority have justifiably led to scholarly concern of 
executive overreaching and the seemingly limitless scope of the “war on 
terror.”223  However, the AUMF contains a principled limitation upon the 
detention of extremists by narrowing the scope of permissible military 
force, and thus detention, to that used against organizations responsible 
for the September 11 attacks—namely, al Qaeda.  Judge Wilkinson, in 
al-Marri III, similarly espoused an “authorization” requirement, 
recognizing that it is “both consistent with our traditional conception of 
who should and should not be eligible for detention and appropriate in 
light of the constitutional imperative that military detention be the 
exception and not the rule.”224 
Limiting the application of the enemy combatant label to those 
affiliated with an organization against which Congress has authorized the 
use of force serves another important purpose: it helps to conceptualize 
an end to the hostilities.  Traditionally, a combatant could be detained for 
the length of hostilities, to prevent his return to the battlefield.225  One of 
the most disconcerting aspects of the “war on terror” is its seemingly 
indefinite nature.  By limiting the military response to al Qaeda and its 
affiliates, identification of the “enemy” is achieved and an end to the 
hostilities foreseeable. 
                                                          
 221. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
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c. The Individual Must Have Intentionally Engaged in or Prepared for 
Hostilities 
By requiring that the individual have intentionally engaged in or 
prepared for hostilities, the definition furthers the purposes behind the 
distinction between combatants and civilians.  In particular, it prevents 
the detention of the truly innocent and protects the sanctity of combatant 
immunity by penalizing those who engage in hostilities without the right 
to do so.  This participation requirement ensures that mere membership is 
insufficient to confer combatant status, requiring the government to 
demonstrate activity in furtherance of the organization’s military goals. 
The participation requirement contrasts sharply with the treatment of 
suspected terrorists pursuant to the Military Commissions Act.  The 
MCA defines an “unlawful enemy combatant” as any individual who has 
“purposefully and materially supported hostilities.”226  As observed by 
scholar Jordan J. Paust, “[o]ne who merely materially supports hostilities 
is not a fighter or combatant.”227  For example, the standard could 
encompass an individual who unwittingly makes a monetary contribution 
to a terrorist organization,228 or a cleric who incites violence through 
political writings or speeches.229  The detention of such individuals 
deviates substantially from international norms relating to the detention 
of civilians, emphasizing intentional and active participation, and 
therefore should not be permissible.  On the other hand, the detention of 
active participants conforms to the innocence-based notion of civilian 
status currently expressed in international law and supported by the 
practice of states.  It therefore successfully balances the traditional 
rationales behind combatant status and immunity with the realities of 
modern warfare. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The traditional judicial conception of an “enemy combatant” must be 
modified so as to encompass all individuals engaging in or preparing for 
hostile activities on behalf of organizations against which Congress has 
authorized the use of force.  This approach properly defers to the 
determination of Congress that the attacks on September 11 initiated a 
state of warfare between the United States and a nontraditional actor 
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while simultaneously ensuring that detention occurs only within 
permissible constitutional bounds.  The proposed definition also 
conforms to the historical purposes for delineating between combatants 
and civilians by emphasizing not only the conventional indicia of 
combatant status—association—but also the degree to which the 
individual has engaged in belligerent conduct.  Finally, it prevents 
excessive military intrusion into civilian society by requiring 
congressional oversight of the scope of permitted detentions pursuant to 
a customary authorization of force.  Although warfare always creates an 
alarming potential for governmental overreach and unwarranted 
encroachments upon civil liberties, the proposed definition reduces the 
persuasive force of such concerns by achieving what Chief Justice 
Rehnquist termed the “most important task” of our society: a proper 
balance between freedom and order.230 
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